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Abstract
Envy is a rather complex and irrational emotion. In general, it is very difficult to
obtain a measure of this feeling, but in an economical context envy becomes an
observable which can be measured. When various individuals compare their posses-
sions, envy arises due to the inequality of their different allocations of commodities
and different preferences. In this paper, we show that an equitable distribution of
goods does not guarantee a state of fairness between agents and in general that
envy cannot be controlled by tuning the distribution of goods.
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1 Introduction
Envy is commonly defined as a feeling with a negative character that affects
the social relationships making it rather complicated to define and, therefore,
to measure. In economics, this envy relation can be established as a phe-
nomenon that emerges after interpersonal comparisons between agents. From
this point of view, envy can be considered as an economical observable that
can be measured. We have developed a model where we analyze the emergence
of envy in a network of agents when there is an allocation of goods. Each agent
has a list with individual preferences in mind that restricts his/her choices.
The satisfaction level at the end of the allocation process is measured ac-
cording to the restrictions imposed by their preferences. This model could be
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applied in behavioral economics [1],[2] and potentially in physics, in particular
measurement problems, which are related to conditional probabilities [3],[4].
Previous investigations about similar systems are based on the development
of a single model that describes the dynamics between agents as the dynamics
of a network where the agents are located on its nodes [5][6]. An equivalent
concept has been used by Donangelo et al. to model a network of trading agents
as an interaction rule. Here the exchange between agents consists of goods as
well as information that can be quantified [7]. On the other hand, interpersonal
relations have been studied in markets with a finite number of agents and a
finite number of goods in economics without production, see e.g. Schmeidler
et al. [11]. This paper exhibits a fundamental definition of fairness, depending
on some trading properties of the agents and prices, without considering the
quality of goods or a fairness index.
Our motivation is to investigate interpersonal relations between the agents
and to understand how the market motivates the evolution of these relations.
We do not model envy as a network of trading agents interacting via envy
relations, but we analyze the behavior of the agents as a function of parameters
of allocation and the form in which agents compare their goods. Because
emotions cannot be defined in a unique way, we develop a model that uses envy
as a factor that modifies the conformation of a network based on information
exchange. This information exchange is determined by the amount of envy.
We suppose that an unidirectional exchange of information (each agent only
observes his/her neighbors) is made through perfect channels, i.e., there is
no noise or some other disruption in the transmission of information between
agents. The existence of these channels ensures perfect comparisons, supposing
that each agent has access to the content of information, i.e., the kind and
number of goods assigned to other agents. This situation can be imagined as a
group of agents with webcams, i.e., instruments to observe what other agents
have, making them able to compare their actual situation with the situation
of the other agents whom they can watch.
A maximized allocation, a situation in which each agent is reaching the best
state with his/her endowment (see e.g. [8]), is called ’pareto’ efficient. Oth-
erwise, the individuals search for a larger allocation with a larger welfare,
motivated by the possibility to get a larger utility level reflected in their in-
terpersonal comparisons. Given the diffuse definition of the notion of envy, we
present some fundamental concepts and theory from an economical point of
view in Sec. 2. In Sec. 3, we explain the fundamental schemes and ideas in the
formulation of our model. In Sec. 4, we propose our main results. Section 5 is
devoted to the main conclusions obtained in this investigation.
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2 Fundamental economical concepts
In economics, the first concept of equity, as no-envy, is due to Foley [9], in-
troducing the concept of envy-free allocations: an allocation is equitable (or
envy-free) if no agent prefers the bundle of another agent to his own. In this
case we can say, there is a situation with fairness defined as no-envy.
The simplest problem of fairness is that of dividing a homogeneous commodity
among a set of agents with equal claims on it. In this case, equal division (or
equal income situation) is clearly the appropriate solution. If we want to have
efficiency of this type of allocation and preserve its property of symmetry,
the concept of fairness must be redefined. We define this equilibrium state as
the moment when each person chooses the most preferred bundle in his/her
budget set, and the choices exhaust the available supply.
An allocation is fair if it is envy-free and efficient [10]. An allocation in a
walrasian equilibrium with equal income is fair in this sense, but the converse
no longer holds at all. A walrasian equilibrium is defined as a state where
the aggregate excess demand (sum of all individual demands minus sum of
all individual supplies) is equal to zero. So, if a bundle B′i is preferred by
agent i to the bundle Bi he/she currently possesses then the excess demand
is different from zero. Hence, when the agents have equal initial endowments
and equal possibilities in the market, they can easily reach their maximum
utility getting a fair trade [11].
A distribution of goods is said to be envy-free when no one prefers anyone
else’s bundle of resources to his/her own. The suggestion here is that envy
is not the psychological motivation for the concern with equality, but rather
that, where a distribution in fact produces envy, this is a reason to doubt the
fairness of the distribution. But envy in this context is a technical term for
any situation in which someone prefers another’s bundles of goods, and does
not refer to the emotional syndrome with which this envy is concerned.
3 Model
For the construction of our model, we need three basic elements: the first one
is a set of various goods of K different kinds located in a depot. For each kind
k of goods, a specific number G(k) of goods exists. Our second element is a
set of agents. There are N agents in our model. Each agent i has a preference
list Pi of his/her preferred goods. This preference list Pi can be coded as a
permutation of the numbers 1, . . . , K with Pi(1) being the good being most
important for agent i, Pi(2) being the good second important, and so on. The
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third element is a set of individual ’baskets’ Bi in which the agents can deposit
their goods after picking them up from the set of goods in the depot. Bi(k)
thus denotes the number of goods of kind k the agent i has got in his/her
basket. After all the goods have been picked up by the agents at the depot,
the following equation holds
K∑
k=1
G(k) =
N∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
Bi(k) +R (1)
with G(k) being the number of goods of kind k in the depot before the first
agent has entered the depot to take some goods into his/her basket. R are the
remaining goods in the depot that any body wants.
Fig. 1. System of agents in a depot, in which there is a predetermined amount of
goods. Each agent has already a preference list Pi in mind and is able to take goods
according to his/her preference list and put them into his/her basket Bi. There are
K different kinds of goods, G(k) is the number of goods available for each kind.
Each agent is allowed to take a maximum number of goods M .
According to their individual preferences, the agents search for goods of their
highest ranked preference in the available set of goods. Every agent is allowed
to take an overall number M of goods. If the searched good of the highest
preference is no more available, the agent starts to collect the good second on
his/her preference list, and so on. Each agent takes the goods from the set
of goods into his/her basket. This situation is shown in Fig. 1: several agents
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enter the depot in a random order. The first agent according to this randomly
created queue takesM stored goods (for example motorbikes, computers, etc.)
into his/her basket. Then he/she leaves the depot and the second agent in the
queue enters the depot. He/she also takes M goods from the depot, selecting
them according to the preference list he/she has in mind, and leaves the depot.
This is repeated until theN th agent takes the remainingM goods. The overall
number of goods is just sufficient for the agents in our model, i.e.,
N ×M +R =
K∑
k=1
G(k). (2)
There is no production or destruction of goods. The number of agents also
remains constant. So, when the agent takes a good into his/her basket, there
is a depletion of one good in the depot.
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Fig. 2. Plot of the distribution of goods for two different distribution amplitudes.
k denotes the kind of goods and G(k) the number of goods of kind k. A is the
parameter associated to the distribution amplitude of goods.
In a first approach, we keep the number of goods G(k) ≡ G equal for each kind
of goods in the depot in order to analyze i) fairness in equitable distributions
and ii) the dependence between our parameters. Later on, we will introduce
differences in the number of available goods. Following the rule of Knuth, we
define the distribution of the number of goods G(k) according to the Gamma
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distribution
G(k)[A] =
(x− k0)
A−1e−(x−k0)
Γ(A)
, (3)
where k0 is the index of the good around which the distribution is peaked
and Γ(A) is the gamma function [13]. In this equation the parameter A is
the amplitude of the Gamma distribution, i.e. the variation of this parameter
produces a more or less uniform initial distribution of goods in the depot.
The Gamma distribution has been used in a variety of settings, including the
income distribution and production functions [12] and for this reason it is a
first choice for introducing it in our model. An example of the applied distri-
bution is shown in Fig. 2. (Furthermore, the Gamma distribution approaches
the Gaussian distribution for large numbers, but does not exhibit some un-
wanted properties of the Gaussian distribution, like some finite probability
for negative numbers. This is a very advantageous property of the Gamma
distribution in comparison to the Gaussian distribution.)
Fig. 3. Schema representing, how envy emerges among the agents i = 1, 2, 3 with
similar preferences (inside the clouds). The acquired bundle Bi lies in front of each
agent. A light arrow from some agent i to an agent j represents that agent i looks
into the basket of agent j. The bold arrow represents the bearing of the envy relation,
because agents 1 and 2 acquired their desired goods but agent 3 did not. f = 3,
where f = 3 represents the number of comparisons in the system.
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After the distribution of goods, the agents are allowed to take a look into the
baskets of some other agents and to compare their own goods with the goods
of these other agents according to their own preference lists. Some agents
are satisfied because they filled their baskets better according to their own
preference lists, while other individuals notice that the baskets they look into
are filled with goods which are on top of their own preference lists but which
they failed to get. In this case, envy emerges. This situation is shown in Fig.
3.
Let us now define more clearly when envy occurs: two agents i and j are
randomly chosen. They are allowed to look into the baskets of each other. Of
course, they first check for the goods on top of their preference lists. Now if
agent i sees that Bj(Pi(1)) > Bi(Pi(1)), i.e., that agent j has more of the good
on top of his/her preference list than himself/herself, then agent i feels a strong
surge of envy. Contrarily, if Bj(Pi(1)) < Bi(Pi(1)), i.e., if agent j has less of
the good on top of the preference list of agent i, then agent i is satisfied. In
the case that Bj(Pi(1)) = Bi(Pi(1)), agent i checks for the second good on the
preference list. Here again agent i might get satisfied if Bj(Pi(2)) < Bi(Pi(2)),
envious if Bj(Pi(2)) > Bj(Pi(2)), or willing to inspect the basket according to
good Pi(3) if Bj(Pi(2)) = Bi(Pi(2)). This approach is repeated till the baskets
are equally filled with goods of higher priority. In the special case that both
baskets are identical, no envy occurs. We can write this envy relation of the
envy agent i might feel towards agent j formally as
Ei(j) =
K∑
k=1
Θ(bj(Pi(k))− bi(Pi(k)))×
k−1∏
l=1
δ(bi(Pi(l)), bj(Pi(l))) (4)
with the Heaviside function
Θ(x) =
{
1 if x > 0
0 otherwise
(5)
and the Kronecker symbol
δ(x, y) =
{
1 if x = y
0 otherwise
. (6)
Thus, one has
Ei(j) =
{
1 if agent i feels envy towards agent j
0 otherwise
. (7)
Of course, when determining Ei(j) in our simulations, we do not use Eq. (4)
but the approach described above needs much less calculation time. Note that
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the addend for k = 1 in Eq. (4) is welldefined as the empty product
∏0
l=1 . . .
has a value of 1.
Thus, after the agents have taken the goods from the depot, we create pairs
(i, j) of agents who are allowed to look in each other’s basket. The determina-
tion of the goods at the depot was performed in a completely rational manner
by the agents. But now they are afraid that some other agent might have got-
ten some better goods out of the depot that himself/herself according to the
own preference list. Here the behavior of the agents becomes irrational. Thus,
we decide here not to give the agents some elaborate strategies at which other
agents to look for baskets which are filled in a better way, i.e., with the more
desired goods, but we implant the simple thought in their brains to randomly
select other agents and look into their baskets. There is no particular difference
between the agents except the contents of their baskets and their preference
lists. Due to this equality of the agents and their irrationality, we think that
it is appropriate to choose the pairs of agents completely at random.
At the same time when agent i looks into the basket of agent j, agent j looks
into the basket of agent i. Due to the usually different preference lists Pi and
Pj of agents i and j, four different cases can occur: either none of them feels
envy, as both of them are satisfied due to their different preference lists, or
exactly one of them feels a strong surge of envy, whereas the other one feels
satisfied, or both are envious towards each other.
Each agent is allowed to make “visual contact” with f other agent on average
and to look into their baskets. The random selection of pairs of agents leads
to a random network [14], as shown in Fig. 4. Please note that all edges in this
network are undirected, i.e., if there is an edge from agent i to agent j, also
the edge from j to i exists. This random network can simply be described via
a symmetric edge matrix η with
η(i, j) =
{
1 if an edge between i and j exists
0 otherwise
. (8)
After the edges have been chosen, we can define a Hamiltonian E for this
network of agents, summing up the amount of envy occurring in this network:
E =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
η(i, j)×Ei(j) (9)
Note that the value of E is usually different from the number NE of envious
agents, which is given by
NE =
N∑
i=1
Θ

 N∑
j=1
η(i, j)×Ei(j)

 , (10)
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as a dog in the manger can feel envy towards more than only one other agent.
An envy network is created due to the assignment of goods to the baskets
of the agents, who make comparisons based on their own preferences, and
emerges only when the system is out of a Walrasian equilibrium, i.e. when
there is a bad allocation of goods. Our model is not a typical optimization
problem, in which the global optimum of a proposed pay-off function (free
energy for instance) has to be found. When agents try to find a solution which
is optimal for themselves, this solution, which is called Nash equilibrium, might
not be a global optimum of the whole problem [15]. Our pay-off function here,
which determines the amount of envy, is a measure of how far the system is
from the equilibrium state. So we analyze the connectivity dependence on the
assignation of goods and the number of agents that express envy.
The fairness state, and not the topology of the network, is the main problem in
this investigation [16]. We have particular interest in the measurement of the
number NE of agents with envy. For this reason, envy is rescaled in our model
by the total number of edges in the network divided through the total number
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
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J
Fig. 4. Snapshot of a random network of interpersonal comparisons in a system of
envious agents. The nodes in the network represent the agents. The edges between
the nodes symbolize the relations that pairs of agents are allowed to look into the
baskets of each other. Please note that the spatial arrangement of the agents does
not play any role here.
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of nodes (agents). There is a fairness state when there are no connections
between the nodes of the random network, as then E = 0. Otherwise, we
recognize the emergence of an envy state.
This network represents the bidirectional exchange of information between
agents, i.e., each agent looks into the basket of the other agent searching for
goods of his/her own preference. Because they can look at but not remove
goods from the basket of the other agent or exchange goods, the envy relation
due to interpersonal comparisons cannot be resolved.
Is it possible to improve the fairness by increasing the amplitude of the num-
ber of goods? At a first glance, this is a plausible way to get a very small
envy network between the agents. We want to probe this hypothesis making
a variation of the amplitude of the distribution of goods A.
According to the conventional definitions of fairness, an allocation is fair when
it is also symmetric [17]. Theoretically, when an asymmetry is presented two
different states are generated, namely inferiority, because an unsatisfied agent
wants the object or good that the other agent has (object of envy) and, on
the other hand, superiority, because an agent possesses a good that the other
one wants [18].
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Fig. 5. Envy E as a function of G (top) and M (bottom). Each point was computed
for distributions with maximal ten units of each kind of goods.
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4 Results
We performed simulations with N = 100 agents and K = 100 different kinds
of goods. The total number of goods in the system is determined in a random
way governed by the Gamma distribution. Each agent can have a look into
the basket of the neighboring agents. Given that the system is closed (there
are no changes in the numbers of goods and the preferences remain the same)
then the system must reach an equilibrium state in the distribution of envious
agents for f →∞.
In a first set of simulations, we use G(k) ≡ G for all kinds k of goods. The envy
E as a function of G is presented in Fig. 5. The envy relation grows according
to the increment of the number f of contacts assigned to each agent. For large
numbers of allowed comparisons, this result can be fitted with an exponential
function, suggesting that the envy distribution corresponds to some kind of
Boltzmann distribution in the network. This analogy makes it possible to
relate G to a kind of temperature of the system.
1 10 100
f
0.1
1
10
E
A=5
A=10
A=30
A=40
Fig. 6. General dependence on the envy between agents as a function of the number
of interpersonal comparisons f . In this case we analyze the behavior of the relation
between agents for different distribution amplitudes A.
A ”non walrasian equilibrium state” is reached when the agents are allowed
to explore all the baskets of the other agents. A fair state cannot be reached
by increasing the supply of each kind of goods. This mechanism seems to be
very clear in a society, where envy is the motor that ensures consumption.
Innovation is related to the increment of the kind of goods supplied in the
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market. This increment shows that, contrary to a stagnation, there is still a
tendency to increase the consumption. In other words, innovation plays the
role of a ”thermostat” in a consumption society.
The analysis of envy as a function of M is also shown in Fig. 5. The increase
of M generates a logarithmic increase of envy. The shape of the fit does not
depend on the number of comparisons allowed between agents. This is an
empirical law that expresses how an increase in the allocated number of goods
is not a guarantee for the improvement of fairness in a set of agents. Now the
problem is to implement this situation in a nonuniform distribution of goods.
Varian has demonstrated the existence of fair allocations [10]. Also Kant called
for better allocations that lower or suppress envy [19]. As already mentioned
above, we search for a fair allocation by controlling the distribution of goods
through the amplitude parameter A. The expected result is a low envy relation
by broadly distributed numbers of goods. These allocations must appear as
fairer allocations.
In order to test the role of the distribution of goods for the initial allocation
we fixed the number of kinds of goods in 100 and repeated our simulations
for envy as a function of f and A. Our computer simulations show a rather
different scenario as the theoretical one: with a broad distribution, the envy in
the network increases (see Fig. 6). This implies, envy cannot be controlled by
adjusting the distribution of goods. For the low number of allowed comparisons
f , there is a convergence of the curves, computed as a function of the parameter
A
E =
n∑
i=1
qi(fl)
i. (11)
Good agreement was found using polynomials of degree two. This means, this
kind of system does not allow to become a preferred number of connections de-
pending on the agent, a behavior commonly associated with random networks
converging into free scale ones [5].
The parameters in the polynomial have dependence on the amplitude of dis-
tribution, i.e. qi = qi(A). In particular the dependence of q1 and q2 on A is
shown in Fig. 7. In both cases the Envy increase when the symmetry of the
distribution is higher: The fairness is not improved by increasing the symmetry
in the distribution of goods.
In order to test the role of the distribution of goods in the allocations, we
repeated our simulations for envy as a function of f and A. The results for this
approach are shown in Fig. 8. In these simulations, the effect of the variation
of G(k)[A], on NE is analyzed. The number of envious agents is again small
12
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Fig. 7. Dependence of the parameters qi on the parameter A for i = 1 and i = 2.
when the number of goods of each kind is large. So for 〈G(k)[A]〉k ≈ 300 the
number of envious agents is roughly 7% of the total number of agents, whereas
for 〈G(k)[A]〉k ≈ 100 the fraction of envious agents is approximately 15%. If
the number of goods is infinite and if there are only a few agents, then the
number NE of envious agents is zero and thus E is zero.
The variation of A has an effect on the distribution function. This computa-
tion was made for G(k0)[A] = 100. For A = 5 the simulations show a very
asymmetric and narrow distribution of envious agents, while for A = 80 the
distribution of envious agents is slightly broader and shifted towards larger
numbers NE of envious agents. Therefore, a uniform distribution increases
the number of potentially envious agents. This result also means that a non
uniform distribution boosts the number of envious agents with particular pref-
erences. We can interpret these graphics under the light of a planified economy,
for example, as a post-war system (in which the distribution of goods is rig-
orously controlled and in which the number of goods is comparable to the
number of agents in the system) and a capitalistic system. In the first case,
no matter how uniform the distribution of goods is, the probability to find an
envious agent never vanishes. In the second case, the narrow distribution of
agents shows the way how the initial distribution of goods can be adapted in
order to satisfy the demand.
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Fig. 8. Distribution of agents expressing envy. We analyze the behavior of the re-
lation between agents for different distribution amplitudes A. NE is the number of
agents expressing envy. ρ is the density of this distribution.
5 Concluding Remarks
The construction of models of agents with particular features, like societies,
is often hard to implement 1 . Furthermore the comprehension of the emo-
tional (subjective) component in a trading network is fundamental to develop
strategies in order to understand economical and social systems. The model
presented here is a static portrait in a state equivalent to an equilibrium state
for a closed system where a set of agents with individual preferences is allowed
to take objects from a depot with an initial distribution of goods. The results
show, under which conditions the agents are not satisfied with the goods, they
are able to acquire. Two equilibrium concepts arising, one from the economical
theory and the other from statistical mechanics. These equilibria are required
for the construction of the present model. From an economical point of view,
this system is far from equilibrium (defined as a Walrasian one, where the
sum of total demands must be equal to the sum of total supplies of the econ-
omy) when the agents develop interpersonal comparisons. Here, the number
of interpersonal comparisons is equivalent to the magnitude of an envy field.
From the physical point of view, the system reaches an equilibrium state (sta-
tistical equilibrium) when the agents are able to make enough interpersonal
1 And set the problem presented in the Arrow’s impossibility theorem
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comparisons in order to explore the whole space of agents; after a large number
of interpersonal omparisons it is possible to quantify a distribution of envious
agents that does not change in time. Furthermore, the existence of a statistical
equilibrium is tested by simulations, based on a Monte Carlo method.
The number of envious agents depends on the number of possible comparisons
and the amount of available goods in the system. For very few visual contacts
between the agents, the envy level is zero, and only after many interpersonal
comparisons, i.e. after a long time, the system reaches a stable envy state
(please note that we do not consider time directly, but the parameter f of the
number of comparisons can be interpreted as a measure of time). Also when
the number of agents is small compared to the number of goods, the number
of envious agents tends to be zero. These results imply a simple conclusion:
agents with very good allocations and agents with no visual contact to other
agents do not have any chance to develop envy.
The control of the distribution of the number of goods is a way to control
the amount of envy among the agents. However, the results obtained in the
present calculations are quite contra-intuitive: a uniform distribution of goods
does not decrease the number of envious agents.
This model appears like a caricature of a society of agents with feelings. We
show what could happen when the information of the preferences of the agents
is accessible and the interaction is fixed. In contrast, in a real scenario all agents
can develop particular strategies in order to get the goods they want and to
improve their welfare, formally represented by means of their utility functions.
Furthermore, the opinion of an agent is not fixed and could change when it
is exposed to information that changes his/her ’mind’. A good example is
a magazine about mode and superstars, offering new goods that change the
preferences of the people and the market supply. Therefore, an interesting
perspective of this investigation could be the consideration of an evolutive
panorama.
While agents remain in the system who would like to have the goods that
the other agent at whom they look possesses, we show in the present results
the impossibility to reach the desired and ideal Walrasian equilibrium state
by controlling the distribution of goods in the depot, when the number of
goods is limited. That means, an equilibrium in statistics implies a non Wal-
rasian equilibrium. Models that far from equilibrium could be considered by
introducing changes in the numbers of goods or agents in the system, or with
dynamical preference lists for the agents, which change in time and thus force
the agents to adjust the contents of their baskets by taking other available
goods which are then on top of their preference lists, by which the Walrasian
equilibrium is improved.
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